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Abstract 
 
The point of departure for this paper is the realisation that the regional dimensions of international 
society have not been conceptualised adequately by International Relations scholars. One 
consequence of this, I argue, is that what could have been understood as regionally-led change 
has been framed as revolutionary exceptions or imperialist drives for power aggregation. I attempt 
to develop this point by demonstrating how, for example, the EU and international fascism (in this 
paper mainly associated with Germany, Italy and Japan during WWII) might instead be considered 
as cases of regional differentiation within international society. Two things are accomplished via 
this analysis. First, the cases are ‘normalised’, making a more accurate historical description of 
their respective developments possible. Second, by taking these regionally-led developments 
seriously, the potential for fundamental change to the core institutions of international society 
becomes a distinct possibility and thus unsettles our whole Westphalian imagination. 
 
Keywords: English School; regional international societies; EU; fascism; communism; French 
revolution; American revolution. 
 
Introduction 
 
This article is in an important sense an attempt to re-write the history of modern international 
relations, or more aptly, to reconfigure the theoretical lenses through which we view and 
conceptualise that history. By modern international relations, I roughly mean the period from the 
peace of Westphalia in 1648 and up until the present. My main concern is that this history has 
traditionally been told from the perspective of what I term the statist paradigm, which is based on 
two assumptions.  The first assumption is that a state’s authority is absolute and exclusive; that is, 
authority is hierarchically organized within the state (there is one supreme authority), and 
furthermore, authority is territorially isolated from any encroachment by outsiders - this is the 
principle of state sovereignty. The second assumption is that individuals will always, per default, be 
                                               
1 The author would like to thank Barry Buzan and Arie Kacowicz for helpful comments on an earlier draft.  
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predominantly loyal to their state (or their nation, which if not in possession of a state, must seek to 
establish one). In other words, it is considered natural for authority and community to be congruent 
(Spruyt 1994, 3; Deudney 1995, 192-3; Osiander 2007, 5; Fabbrini 2007, 87). Meanwhile, as 
Osiander (2007, 18-9) reminds us, these assumptions are only ideas, which originated in a specific 
time and place in history: the centuries following the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Most people 
today may share them, but there is nothing natural about them, and there is nothing to suggest that 
some individuals may not genuinely hold conflicting ideas.  
Following on from this, the point is that these assumptions have been turned into a 
standard or default theoretical framework in International Relations (IR)2 that prevents us from 
seeing - or at least taking seriously – historical developments that challenge one or both of these 
assumptions. In this article I will analyse four prominent cases of this: The American/French 
revolutions, international fascism/Nazism, international communism and the European 
Community/European Union. They are all in one way or another examples of communities of 
loyalty transcending the state and/or of absolute authority being made divisible either inside or 
across the territorial boundaries of the state.   
It is very interesting to observe how traditional IR theory (the statist paradigm), as well as 
the cognate discipline of diplomatic history, has dealt with, or portrayed, these cases: Either they 
have been exceptionalised as something temporary and/or aberrant or they have been normalised  
as the standard pursuit of state interests in accordance with the assumptions of the statist 
paradigm. To give a few examples, international fascism and international communism are often 
portrayed as pathological exceptions, undermining international order, and the EU is described as 
a sui generis development in international relations or an UPO (unidentified political object), as one 
former president of the European Commission put it. At the other end of the scale, nazi 
expansionism or the Napoleonic conquests associated with the French revolution have been 
normalised as standard acts of state imperialism.3  
 However, I do not only want to suggest that the statist paradigm is misleading – this has 
already been accomplished by scholars such as Mansbach and Ferguson (1996), Osiander (2007) 
and Cerny (2010) – but also tell an alternative history of these cases from the perspective of the 
so-called English School of IR. All theories in a sense obscure some things while bringing other 
things into sharper focus, and this is also true of the English School. Nevertheless, I do believe that 
it is fundamentally less plagued by a set of faulty assumptions akin to the two that inform the statist 
paradigm, and at least to that extent does provide a more accurate history. Here I will provide a 
brief introduction to the English School, before moving on to some initial remarks about what the 
alternative story that springs from it can tell us about international relations and the broader subject 
of geopolitics.  
                                               
2 I use the standard capitals to indicate the discipline of International Relations as distinct from its subject 
matter.  
3 Examples in the literature are too numerous to reference. However, I will touch upon some of these works 
in the following analysis of the individual cases. 
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The English School of International Relations 
 
Although there are different strands of thinking within the English School, all adherents take as 
their point of departure the existence of an ‘international society’. In Bull’s and Watson’s (1984, 1) 
classic formulation: 
 
A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political 
communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the 
behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but 
also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common 
interest in maintaining these arrangements. 
 
Bull (1977) - mainly talking about international relations in the modern era (post-1648) - identified 
five such international social institutions: 1) the balance of power; 2) international law; 3) 
diplomacy; 4) war; and 5) the great powers. It is crucial to emphasise that these are institutions in 
the social sense of bundles of practices, ideas and norms/rules, and not institutions in the physical 
sense of international organisations and regimes. It should equally be stressed that there is 
currently no scholarly consensus on what should count as an institution and how many institutions 
there are in international society at any given time (Buzan 2004, ch.6; Wilson 2009). This is quite 
important as one of my key arguments below is that these institutions change over time and with 
them international society. I will explore some of the classical institutions identified by Bull, notably 
diplomacy, war and international law, but I will also look at less traditional institutional candidates 
such as trade relationships and principles of legitimacy – again as social bundles of practices, 
ideas and norms/rules.      
Another idea that features prominently in English School debates is the distinction between 
‘international system’ and ‘international society’. This is implied in Bull’s and Watson’s quote 
above, where they distinguish the social relationships in international society from the more basic, 
mechanical interaction of a system of states where no social institutions or norms of behaviour 
have yet been established. It should be noted that only some English School scholars subscribe to 
the social progression idea (from international system to international society), whereas others 
view international system and international society as coexisting simultaneously. In the latter 
perspective, international system often becomes associated with statist or realist elements in 
international relations, whereas international society largely represents liberal aspirations for 
international order. On this point, however, I belong to that group of English School scholars who 
believe that this distinction is essentially untenable. As Buzan (2004, 99) convincingly argues, 
‘physical interaction without social content is, if not impossible, at least rather rare and marginal in 
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human affairs’. It follows that if all interactions are in some sense social, then there is no reason 
why they cannot be subsumed under the concept of international society.  
An interesting point that follows from this conclusion is that the standard claim - which is 
often put forward by followers of the statist paradigm - to the effect that the states-system will 
always reassert itself against idealist or transnational movements attempting to change it, is 
fundamentally misguided. The states-system is itself a social system that has been, and is, 
continuously evolving. Seeing the states-system as something fixed, structural and immovable in 
opposition to weak and ephemeral social ideas is basically untenable from this perspective. 
A related point – and here it should be stressed that far from all English School scholars 
buy into this interpretation – is that it does not make sense to operate with an essential notion of 
the state. Many English School scholars no doubt recognise that states can have different 
identities and thus different interests and ways of behaving. Yet, they predominantly subscribe to 
the idea that theorising about international relations should start with the concept of independent 
political communities, as again implied in Bull and Watson’s quote above. The problem here is that 
the idea of independence perpetuates statist assumptions of exclusive loyalties and indivisible 
authority (again see Mansbach and Ferguson 1996; Osiander 2007; Cerny 2010). Although 
admirable works of conceptual history, both Watson’s (1992) The Evolution of International Society 
and Armstrong’s (1993) Revolution and World Order  appear to fall into this trap. In its stead, we 
should rather speak of plural and overlapping political communities, defined as ‘individuals 
considering themselves and each other to share important interests across a range of issues’ 
(Osiander 2007, 29) and/or polities, defined as centres of legitimised authority (Mansbach and 
Ferguson 1996). The state - in the sense of an independent and centralised authority - is one such 
polity, but only one out of many different types.   
How does this framework alter the stories, and indeed histories, we narrate about 
international relations and geopolitics? The immediate response is obviously that the reader should 
move on to the case studies below and make up his or her own mind. But let me briefly pick up a 
few points which I will further elaborate on in the conclusion. The first point is that this framework 
cautions us to take seriously political movements such as, for example, international communism 
and international fascism and their potential to fundamentally change the international system, 
international society. Not just change the balance of power between leading states, but 
fundamentally alter how power and political communities are constituted. The point is not to 
overestimate the appeal of either fascism or communism, but only to recognise that they did hold 
some appeal as principles of legitimacy and were promoted by powerful social movements and 
consequently left permanent imprints on international society. A second point, and this relates 
particularly to the subject of geopolitics, is that international society should not be viewed as one 
monolithic whole. The cases I will explore below can all be thought of as sub-global or regionally-
led change in international society. Geography and space in terms of the reach and spread of 
various international social institutions thus become a key concern. This should also be a welcome 
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development for those scholars who have called for more English School engagement with the 
idea of regions (Buzan 2004; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009).   
Four cases have been singled out for analysis. These are revolutionary 
America/revolutionary France of the 18th and 19th centuries, the fascist regimes in Europe and Asia 
of the 1930s and 1940s, the communist bloc after 1917 and finally the European 
Community/European Union (EC/EU). They have been chosen because they are some of the most 
potent examples of the exceptionalism/normalisation dichotomy in the literature. 
  
Revolutionary America/revolutionary France 
Why consider the American and French revolutions one case? Historians specializing in the period 
often note the profound connections between the two revolutions. First, the French support for the 
American colonists’ cause during the war of independence, and second, the wealth of revolutionary 
ideas carried back to France after the colonists’ hard fought victory (Furet 1992, 35, 73-4; 
Hendrickson 2003, 175). Within IR, Mlada Bukovansky (2002) has successfully argued that they 
can be considered together because they were instrumental in establishing a new principle of 
international legitimacy. For her, their crowning achievement was the replacement of the principle 
of dynastic rule with that of popular sovereignty, amounting to nothing less than a systemic change 
in international politics. To me, this is indeed what connects the two, and in the first part of this 
section I will briefly try to tease out the basic elements of this change. However, other international 
institutions were affected by this political rupture as well, and here it is possible to observe some 
marked differences across the Atlantic. I will offer some observations on these in the second part 
of the section. 
 The great achievement of Bukovansky’s book is her synthesis, based on the most up to 
date historical research, of the cultural system prevailing in Europe in the late 18th century and its 
partial overturn by political entrepreneurs who strategically exploited Enlightenment ideas to found 
a new hegemonic counter-culture. In her account, the international politics of Ancien Régime 
Europe can be described as a macrocosmic representation of the institutionalized rivalry prevailing 
in court politics: ‘International relations was conducted by a class of people for whom prestige 
constituted the primary mode of self-identification and value; retaining their elite status was their 
primary concern; and similar rules of rivalry governed both court politics and international politics’ 
(Bukovansky 2002, 83). Against this system, and partly growing out of it, a new culture emerged in 
the American colonies which negated the legitimacy of court society and instead embraced the 
principle of popular sovereignty. This was a complex process, with a crucial element being the 
reappraisal of republican discourses about the nature of society and government.  
The traditional discourse (which had found a concrete expression in the British form of 
government) held that the ideal society was to be governed by a mixed constitution, with power 
being shared by society’s three orders: the one (monarch); the few (aristocracy); and the many 
(people). For various reasons this discourse went through a transformation in the American 
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context, and Bukovansky (2002, 122) is hence able to conclude that ‘Republicanism was 
essentially recast as democracy, or the politics of competing interests, where balance in politics 
came not from the representation of the three orders of society but rather from the checks and 
balances between branches of government, and between state and federal government. Society in 
turn became conceived of, not as a stratified organic unity, but as a plurality of individuals, all 
competing to further their particular interests’. Her follow-on argument is that this discourse fed 
back into Europe and was exploited strategically by political entrepreneurs in France. This was 
what allowed the Third Estate in 1789 to perform another discursive shift when it constituted itself 
as the National Assembly: ‘the language of liberty versus despotism was overtaken by, and 
subsumed within, the language of equality versus privilege’ (Bukovansky 2002, 185). She 
summarizes the systemic change entailed in this shift in the following way: ‘revolutionary ideas 
altered the purposes of the French state and made its interests incommensurable, not just with the 
interests of other states (which would hardly have been novel) but with the basic structure and 
norms of the European international system itself. Thus the game changed from “France against 
Austria” (for example), to “France against Europe”’ (Bukovansky 2002, 169). ‘The undivided will of 
the people became the basis and legitimation for all policy, including foreign policy’ (Bukovansky 
2002, 190).  
 However, there were marked differences in how the new principle of popular sovereignty 
was converted into practice on each side of the Atlantic. In France, the principle was interpreted in 
a very ‘nationalistic’ and exclusive way. The National Assembly - and latterly the National 
Constituent Assembly (1789-1791), the Legislative Assembly (1791-1792) and the National 
Convention (1792-1795) - was conceptualized as the sole indivisible expression of the will of the 
people. Since the people could not be divided, neither could its representative assembly. Unity 
became the guiding political motif and any challenge to this unity (either foreign or domestic) per 
definition became a mortal threat to the people. As some leading scholars have pointed out, this 
can be seen as one of the main factors behind the emergence of the terror and the revolutionary 
wars (Furet 1992, ch.3; Singer 1986, ch.14). 
 In America, on the other hand, the idea of popular sovereignty was kept firmly within the 
republican discourse of the mixed constitution. As Deudney (1995, 214-6) and Hendrickson (2003) 
have intriguingly argued, political legitimacy in the early American states-union was never thought 
to be stemming from one nation. Indeed, the colonists did not consider themselves a nation; not at 
the state level, and certainly not at the union level. Rather, popular sovereignty was conceptualized 
within the framework of divisible authority, with power being exercised and kept in balance at both 
the state and union levels. In fact, the early American states-union challenges the traditional, statist 
paradigm in IR in so far as authority was neither absolute nor hierarchical; the prime example 
being that the constituent states maintained the right to an independent military force in the form of 
the citizen militia under command of the governor (Deudney 1995, 201). In line with this, it is not 
possible to identify a single authority as the focal point of citizens’ loyalty. It, too, was divisible.  
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 However, the point is not just that the American states-union does not conform with the two 
assumptions the statist paradigm in IR is based on. Rather, the point is that the American states-
union constituted itself as separate international society with a new interpretation of not only 
sovereignty, but also a range of other international institutions, such as the balance of power, the 
great powers, mercantilism, diplomacy and international law. Hendrickson (2003, 14-23) has 
shown how the prolonged debates preceding the adoption of the constitution in 1788 were 
informed by what could be called a unionist ‘paradigm’ or ‘ideology’. One prominent feature of this 
set of ideas was a negation of the states-system of Europe and its reliance on the balance of 
power as an ordering institution. The authors of the constitution were no doubt receptive to 
equilibrist notions of all sorts, but they were keen to avoid what they saw as the precipice of an 
equilibrium between sovereign states and sought instead to establish a union or ‘peace pact’ 
based on an equilibrium between several centres of authority within a states-union. Moreover, 
when the institution of the great powers was agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
(Osiander 1994, 232-47), as a supporting ordering institution to that of the balance of power, the 
Americans chose to reject it as well (at least when it came to the Western hemisphere), and 
eventually proceeded to proclaim the Monroe doctrine in 1823. 
 The American international society displayed other institutional innovations. It is not 
possible to dwell on them here at any length, but they included a new form of diplomacy, with 
diplomatic agents operating both between the constituent units and union centre and between the 
centre and the states of the European states-system. A fairly strong commitment to the naturalist 
interpretation of international law based on universal principles, as opposed to the increasingly 
positivist orientation prevailing in Europe. And finally, the gradual replacement of mercantilist with 
free-trade practices (Iriye 1977; Armstrong 1993; Deudney 1995; Bukovansky 2002; Hendrickson 
2003).    
 If we turn our eyes to France, then it is also possible to observe a reinterpretation of several 
institutions. However, to fully appreciate this it is best to focus first on the several factors which led 
to the conflagration in Europe. One basic factor was obviously geography. Unlike the American 
colonies, which were at best thought to be located at the fringe of international society, the French 
kingdom was located in the heart of Europe and was considered a key member of international 
society. The challenge posed by its revolution to the prevailing principle of legitimacy in that society 
was therefore all the more urgent.4 In Bukovansky’s words, the game had changed from ‘France 
against Austria’ to ‘France against Europe’. A second basic factor was that the zeal of the French 
revolutionaries, generally speaking, was of a more radical nature than, say, that of the Americans. 
What I mean by this is that both revolutions embodied a universalist principle: a commitment to 
popular rule, whether that be in the institutionalized will of a nation or in the form of a ‘compound 
republic’. This truth was self-evident, the right of all men. However, whereas the American 
                                               
4 It should be noted, though, that European leaders, initially, saw the revolution more as an opportunity than 
a challenge. It was believed that the revolution would first and foremost weaken the French kingdom, not 
pose a threat to the general order of Europe (Bukovansky 2002, 194-5).   
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decision-makers were hesitant about actively promoting this principle abroad in the aftermath of 
the war of independence, their French counterparts seemed quite willing to plunge their country 
into a war with the major powers of Europe (Bukovansky 2002, 153-62, 196-7; Hendrickson 2003, 
175-6).5  
The basic point I’m getting at is that these two factors inevitably pulled the revolution in a 
violent direction, and this can be viewed as both a consequence and a catalyst of institutional 
innovation. As I have already noted, the revolution produced a very exclusive notion of popular 
sovereignty within France, but also, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, a strong commitment to a 
universal notion of this principle which came to signify a community of mankind. In Armstrong’s 
(1993, 85-6) words, 
 
In its most idealistic phase, this aspect of French revolutionary ideology took 
the form of a benevolent cosmopolitanism under which French citizenship 
was offered to ‘lovers of liberty’ from other lands, and vague schemes were 
mooted for the French Assembly to become some kind of international 
legislature. When the Assembly renounced all wars of conquest in 1790, it 
did so in part out of a conviction…that all peoples were part of one great 
society governed by natural law.  
 
The wars that eventually did follow were not considered wars of conquest, but wars of liberation. 
This reconceptualization had important consequences for other international institutions. In 
the case of diplomacy, the French started to address themselves directly to the people of foreign 
countries, what could be termed one of the first instances of ‘public diplomacy’. The famous 
propaganda decree of November 1792 promised ‘fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to 
recover their liberty’, and when the French threatened to appeal directly to the British people to 
prevent that country from entering the war, it prompted George III to declare that ‘this nation...will 
never have with foreign powers connexion or correspondence, except through the organ of its 
King’ (Armstrong 1993, 85, 245). The very character of war was also transformed when France 
instituted the levée en masse. Its scale changed dramatically, and so did its organization, the 
purposes it was fought for and the impact it had on the societies involved.  
While one could argue that reaction set in with the Napoleon’s rise to power in the late 
1790s in terms of a return to some form of monarchical rule, scholars like George Rudé (1964, 
220-2), Jeremy Black (2002, 220, 249) and Bukovansky (2002, 213-4) nevertheless emphasise 
that there was no return to an ancien regime system of international relations in Europe. The 
                                               
5 The outbreak of the wars has been the object of a heated debate among historians. Were the wars 
premised on a clash of ideologies or the pursuit of the national interest? Most of the resulting works are 
prime examples of the influence of the second assumption of the statist paradigm. Although they recognize 
the importance of ideology, the bottom line is that the main factor was ‘reason of state’, since the decision-
makers were ultimately loyal to their respective nation-states. For good reviews, see Bukovansky (2002, 192-
202) and Armstrong (1993, 79-84).  
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game, so to speak, had fundamentally changed, and from that point on the popular will, most often 
expressed in the idea of a nation, was a force to reckoned with, and was appealed to by republican 
and dynastic leaders alike. It was only in France that a full-blown revolution took place, but in the 
rest of Europe, as well as in France, the ideas of the Enlightenment, the permanent legislation of 
the revolutionary assemblies and the liberal principles of the ‘spirit of 1789’ lived on (Rudé 1964, 
221), and so did many of the institutional changes wrought by the revolution.   
To me, this evidence suggests that the French revolution was not so much an imperial drive 
towards the attainment of European hegemony, and that the American revolution had little to do 
with the formation of a new state. Rather, they seemed to be examples of regionally-led change 
within international society, and in the American case, almost an attempt to create a separate and 
independent international society. Admittedly, the French revolution did not succeed in creating a 
lasting community of mankind, and following the civil war America did start to conform to the 
European state model and the norms of Westphalian international society. However, we remain 
blind to some of the enduring institutional changes elaborated above if we persist in our adherence 
to the statist paradigm.     
A fascist international society? 
 
For many people the very idea of a fascist international society will sound as an oxymoron. First, 
there are those who contend that fascism cannot be abstracted into a wider phenomenon. For 
them, what is termed ‘forms of fascism’ are in fact highly unique hypernationalist movements which 
it would prove inherently misleading to compare. Second, there are those who see an 
irreconcilable contradiction between fascism (again, as an extreme form of nationalism) and 
anything international. To simply state the possibility of a fascist international society, even before 
the meaning of this concept has been spelled out, would be considered a logical impossibility 
(Morgan 2003, 159-60).6 In this section I shall argue otherwise. Specifically, and similar to the 
argument in the preceding section, I shall contend that fascism can also be understood as a set of 
ideas heralding a new principle of international legitimacy, namely that of a world divided into racial 
regions. I will show how it came to be institutionalized in the tripartite pact between Germany, Italy 
and Japan and how it interacted with other international institutions.     
  For the purpose of establishing the existence fascism as an international principle of 
legitimacy it would be enough to show that a number of polities adhered to this principle in their 
practices and their norms/rules. It would not be necessary to establish any active cooperation 
between them in support of this principle. However, the striking thing about the period from the 
early 1920s to the mid 1940s, seen in the light of the fascism (nationalism)/internationalism 
dichotomy, is exactly the widespread cooperation in support of the principle internationally. First, 
                                               
6 I suspect, but cannot prove, that this has something to do with not being able to recognize the fascist 
regimes as anything but unique instances of pure evil rather than ‘normal’ social phenomena. And second, 
the statist paradigm, which will only allow the Axis campaigns of World War II to be interpreted as familiar 
cases of imperialism.  
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between the fascist regime in Italy and the many fascist movements throughout Europe, then from 
the early 1930s, between Italy and Germany, and from the mid 1930s, between Italy, Germany and 
Japan.7 This cooperation was no doubt riddled with conflicts over various issues, some having to 
do with ideology and some having do with matters of political expediency, but it is nevertheless 
possible to discern a prevailing consensus around a new principle of legitimacy, one grounded in 
the idea of the regeneration of regional civilizations, which gradually came to be defined in racial 
terms.  
 Italian fascism was mainly based on the two principles of corporatism and the totalitarian 
state. The Nazi regime certainly paid respect to the totalitarian principle and embraced a form of 
corporatism, but was also much more committed to the idea of racial purity. However, what the two 
regimes shared with the rest of the fascist movements on the continent was a wider belief in the 
threat posed to European civilization by the degenerate ideologies of liberalism, capitalism and 
Bolshevism. They were united in the joint project of restoring European civilization, however much 
they might disagree about the details and about who should be the leading element, or vanguard 
nation, in this regeneration (De Grand 1995; Morgan 2003, 167-72). 
 Similar ideas were attracting followers in Asia, and in particular Japan. In his recent study of 
the politics of anti-Westernism in Asia, Cemil Aydin (2007, 161-89) convincingly shows how by the 
early 1930s, after the Manchurian incident and the withdrawal from the League of Nations, larger 
and larger sections of Japanese society were turning towards an ideology of pan-Asianism. To be 
sure, pan-Asianism was nothing new. Taken to mean the idea of an Asian identity standing in 
opposition to that of the West, it had been present since at least the great Western imperialist drive 
of the late nineteenth-century, and had received a major boost by the Japanese victory over 
Russia in 1905. What had changed by the 1930s was the close to wholesale abandonment of 
Western international society by the dominant strata of Japanese society, and the vision, 
increasingly couched in racial terms8, of creating a new order in East Asia, separate from the West.  
 It is against this background that one should see the tripartite pact of 1940 between Italy, 
Germany and Japan. Historians often dismiss the treaty as nothing but an instrumental compact 
designed to further the imperialist interests of each state. Furthermore, they add that it proved 
highly ineffectual when it came to concerted action against, especially, the Soviet Union.9 
However, these issues are beside the point. What is important is that it can be seen as cementing 
the principle of a world divided into regions of different civilizations and races. In line with the 
discourses of civilizational regeneration, the preamble to the treaty read:  
                                               
7 This list is not exhaustive. Cooperation with the fascist type states of Spain and Argentina, most notably, 
could be included as well. However, for simplicity’s sake, the discussion will be limited to the former three 
states.  
8 Like the Nazis, the Japanese also developed a distinct East Asian racial hierarchy with the ‘Yamato Race’ 
at its zenith (Martin 1995, 227; Lebra 1975, 118-21). 
9 For a good example, see Bernd Martin (1995, ch.7). However, in a later chapter he concedes the point that 
‘fashioning the world according to fascist-folkish basic principles, overcoming what was regarded as 
demoralising individualism, and the corresponding liberal democratic economic order were the common 
goals of the three signatory states’ (Martin 1995, 248).  
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The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition 
precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its 
own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another 
in regard to their efforts in greater East Asia and regions of Europe 
respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new 
order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the 
peoples concerned’ (The Avalon Project 2008).  
 
The principle was reiterated in the first article of the treaty: ‘Japan recognizes and respects the 
leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe’. And in the second 
article: ‘Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a 
new order in greater East Asia’. It may be that the three signatory states did not do much to honour 
the provisions for military and technical aid, which were also a part of the treaty, and that they in 
the long run might not be inclined to respect each others ‘leadership’, but they did certainly ‘walk 
the walk’. In their policies and practices, all three of them did set out to reshape/regenerate the 
order of the regions they belonged to.   
 These regional projects also had a profound impact on perceptions of trade. In traditional 
historiography, there are two standard narratives regarding trade relations within and between the 
fascist new orders. One narrative is about the strictly instrumental trade cooperation between 
Germany and Japan. In this account, trade relations lacked any real substance, and cooperation in 
this sphere is essentially deemed a propaganda ploy. The second narrative portrays the economic 
system within each region as standard imperialist exploitation. In Martin’s (1995, 272-3) words, 
with reference to the Japanese domain, ‘a “Greater East Asia Robbery Sphere”’. However, when 
an explanation for this situation is on offer, it seems to be intimately tied to the new fascist principle 
of international legitimacy.  
 
Mistrust, envy, and even treachery, together with and outspoken feeling of 
racial superiority, were characteristic of German-Japanese trade relations, 
especially for the period of combined warfare…The New Order of East Asia 
was to be dominated politically and economically by Japan. Tokyo planned to 
become the hub of closed economic sphere where no Western nation, not 
even the befriended Germans, would be granted special privileges (Martin 
1995, 272-3). 
 
 Aydin (2007, 164-5) corroborates this point. According to him, the ‘neomercantilist’ policy of Japan 
was part of a global ideological move away from Western laissez-faire capitalism. What the Nazis 
tried to establish with their new economic order in Europe was broadly similar to the policy of 
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Japan (Mazower 2008, 260-3). It therefore seems quite plausible to make a causal link between 
the new fascist principle of international legitimacy and transformations in the perception of trade. 
 War was another institution which was reinterpreted within the context of the emergence of 
the fascist regimes and World War II. One can point to qualitative changes in doctrine (mobile 
warfare, strategic bombing) and organization (economies and civil societies geared towards total 
war).10 However, the most striking innovation was probably the legitimation of wars of 
extermination. To simplify, in Ancien Régime Europe war was considered a legitimate way of 
settling differences between dynastic rulers. In post-1789 Europe, war became a legitimate way of 
liberating peoples from corrupt rule. In fascist international society, war became a legitimate means 
of establishing, and indeed demonstrating, racial superiority through the annihilation or 
enslavement of inferior competitors. As Morgan (2003, 181-2) has argued, the ideology and 
practises of the Nazis were geared towards securing the ‘future of the Germanic race, in its 
endless struggle for supremacy with other global racial blocs’. On this point, the ideologies of the 
Japanese and Italian regimes were no less explicit. Germany no doubt went farthest in its practices 
with the adoption of the ‘final solution’, but racial and civilizational ‘triumph’ as a legitimate goal of 
war (Weinberg 2005, 47-50, 72-5; Mazower 2008, 340-5), and even political existence as such, 
was obviously a common denominator among the fascist regimes and movements of the 1920s, 
30s and 40s.11 
 Thus to sum up, what could first be construed as simple imperialism, on a closer 
examination instead appears to be coalescence around a new principle of legitimacy. Surely this 
principle implied a great deal of overt violence and domination, but it also entailed the forging of 
new regional blocs aspiring to make nation-state allegiance and supreme authority irrelevant. And 
in this process, the meaning of institutions such as war and trade was significantly altered.    
   
 
The socialist commonwealth 
 
The communist bloc after 1917, or what has been termed the socialist commonwealth, can 
probably be considered the most sustained attempt to create a regional international society with 
the potential of replacing the dominant global Westphalian international society. The fascist 
challenge lasted no more than some 20 years, and the American and French revolutions were 
relatively quickly socialized into the dominant international society by that society’s gradual 
embrace of the principle of popular will as expressed in the idea of nationalism and the American 
states-union’s abandonment of divisible sovereignty to the benefit of the central government, 
                                               
10 It should be noted that some of these doctrinal and organisational changes were also taking place in 
countries like Britain and France.  
11 Here it should likewise be stressed that racial and social Darwinist ideas also had many followers in non-
fascist states and were often tied to practices of colonialism. However, they were never elevated to a core 
principle of legitimacy, as was the case in the fascist regimes.  
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especially after the civil war. In the socialist commonwealth, on the other hand, new international 
institutions were fashioned which at one and the same time heralded both a fundamental challenge 
to Westphalian international society and an attempt to temporarily accommodate it until this 
challenge could be effected. Key among these were the institutions of ‘proletarian internationalism’ 
and ‘peaceful coexistence’. In what follows I will in the usual fashion unpack the meaning of these 
and explore their relationship with other international institutions. 
 As Armstrong (1993, 120) perceptively notes, the successful faction in the Russian 
revolution had to immediately face, and indeed protect, a doctrinal paradox: ‘a revolution based 
upon an ideology that represented itself as the antithesis of the state had taken the concrete form 
of a state’. What he means by this is that the communist ideology was based on an ontology where 
the transnational proletariat was considered to be the only legitimate actor in politics; hence it was 
the antithesis of the state. At the same time, in the early 1920s, the Russian revolutionaries found 
themselves in a position where they were in possession of a state and were surrounded by a 
hostile society of states which certainly did not recognize the legitimacy of the revolution, but would 
grudgingly accept Soviet Russia as a member on the basis of its claim to statehood. The two key 
institutions of the socialist commonwealth were a natural outgrowth of this paradox. They came to 
be known as proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence, and respectively defined 
relations between states or countries within the socialist commonwealth and between the socialist 
commonwealth and Westphalian international society.  
 Both institutions, however, went through various transformations over their 70 years 
lifespan. The initial policy of peaceful coexistence12 was informed by Lenin’s instrumental view of 
the necessity of having relations with capitalist states. ‘The announcement and practice of peaceful 
coexistence would reassure the capitalist world that Bolshevik Russia was essentially peaceable. 
Thus war would be prevented and the urgent task of reconstructing the Russian economy could 
proceed’ (Light 1988, 28). In this view, the inevitability of conflict between the socialist and 
capitalist systems was by no means negated. However, a breathing space was urgently needed 
before the revolution would spread to the rest of the industrialized West.  With Stalin’s rise to 
power, the policy was maintained, although with a slight twist. Peaceful coexistence was no longer 
pursued to keep the Russian revolution afloat while holding out for the eventual world revolution. 
Rather, it was the other way around. The survival of the Russian revolution would aid the latter 
(world revolution) through supporting proletarian movements in other countries and thus hastening 
the eventual demise of capitalism (Light 1988, 32). This is in turn meant that the Russian state 
became the vanguard of world revolution.  
 That point is crucial for understanding the institution of proletarian internationalism. As I 
have already noted, the baseline of the communist ideology was that the transnational proletariat 
was the only legitimate actor in politics. However, in the Bolshevik interpretation, Soviet Russia 
                                               
12 I term it a policy here because, at this point, it had obviously not obtained the status of an institution yet, as 
in durable and recognised patterns of shared practices. 
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was cast as the leading element, which necessarily implied a hierarchy between the socialist 
movement of Russia and other socialist movements, and eventually between the Soviet state and 
other socialist states. As Stalin expressed it in 1927, ‘An internationalist is one who is ready to 
defend the USSR without reservation, without wavering, unconditionally; for the USSR is the base 
of the world revolutionary movement, and this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and 
promoted unless the USSR is defended’ (quoted in Light 1988, 157). Meanwhile, by the early 
1930s Soviet Russia, in its pursuit of peaceful co-existence, had embraced the Westphalian 
institution of sovereignty and its guiding norms of equality, territorial integrity and non-intervention. 
In the aftermath of the World War II, and with the rise of number of socialist states in Eastern 
Europe and South East Asia, these norms were incorporated into the institution of proletarian 
internationalism. In this scheme, relations between socialist states were conceptualized as 
voluntary unity, concerted action and mutual aid in support of world revolution based on the equal 
status of national detachments of the working class. As Light (1988, 180) has noted, the two 
principles of revolutionary hierarchy and national equality could be reconciled as long the pursuit of 
unity was voluntary. Yet, when it was not, conflicts were bound to arise. This was exactly what 
happened in the late 1940s and 1950s. Schisms broke out between especially the Soviet Union 
and China and Yugoslavia concerning the role of the Soviet vanguard in the world revolutionary 
movement and about how accommodating the movement should be with respect to the capitalist 
West, i.e. which policies were legitimate in the pursuit of peaceful coexistence (Light 1988, 170-
88). This tension within the institution of proletarian internationalism persisted all the way up to the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and was also at the heart of the debates about the 
controversial interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). In 
these instances, proletarian internationalism came to imply a right to intervention or what some 
authors have termed the idea of ‘limited sovereignty’ (Jones 1990). 
 The two institutions of proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence interacted with 
other primary institutions in a number of ways. In the early days of the revolution, the Bolsheviks 
were adamant that all forms of traditional diplomacy should be abandoned, as evinced in the 
famous statement ascribed to Trotsky about his intentions when he took up the office of People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs: ‘[to] issue a few revolutionary proclamations and shut up shop’ 
(quoted in Armstrong 1993, 131-2). However, with the gradual realization that Soviet Russia had to 
endure in a society of states, traditional forms of diplomacy had to be embraced. The corollary of 
this development was a perceived need to qualitatively differentiate the institutionalization of 
foreign relations with other contingents of the international working class. This need was met with 
the creation of the Communist International (Comintern) and it successor organizations, where 
Soviet Russia always played a leading role (Armstrong 1993, 131-40).  
 The institution of war also went through various transformations. Perhaps the greatest 
novelty was that war was reinterpreted as both inherently legitimate and inevitable. The impersonal 
forces of history would by default provoke a violent clash between the socialist and capitalist 
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systems. This view was never abandoned, but it was continuously modified within the context of 
the institution of peaceful coexistence; not least with the invention of the atom bomb, which all but 
excluded large-scale warfare as a viable policy-option. The result was the well-known Cold War 
tactics of low-intensity conflict (limited warfare), ideological subversion and support for anti-colonial 
movements in the Third World. 
 Attempts were also made at transforming trade relations within the socialist commonwealth. 
In line with the ideas underpinning proletarian internationalism, a new international socialist division 
of labour was pursued, where the exchange of goods was meant to promote the economic 
progress of the socialist bloc as a whole. The Council of mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) was 
created in 1949 to further this objective and various initiatives throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s sought to institutionalize supra-national economic planning. However, these initiatives were 
in large measure defeated by the strength of the national idea. When Khrushchev in 1962 
proposed the establishment of a supranational planning authority, most socialist republics in 
Eastern Europe opposed it on the basis of the perceived loss of national sovereignty (Light 1988, 
188-94). 
 In the academic literature, as well as in the public debate, the Soviet Union has invariably 
been referred to as an empire. Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech stands out as the emblematic 
designation, and the familiar academic narrative of the break-up of the Soviet Union is cast as the 
fated revolt of long-suppressed national minorities.13 It is no doubt true that the national idea had a 
strong following both within the Soviet Union and the various other states making up the bloc, and 
that coercion and incentives were often put to good use to make the supposed detachments of the 
international working class respect the international institutions of the socialist commonwealth, but 
there are no grounds for the claim that the commonwealth was solely based on a Russian nation’s 
desire to dominate the world. In Kolakowski’s words, ‘it is simply untrue to say that communist rule, 
from the very beginning, had nothing at its disposal except pistols, prisons, and concentration 
camps or that ideology was nothing but a necessary though inert decoration’ (quoted in Tarifa 
1997, 447). The national idea, or principle of legitimacy, was in a contest with that of the 
transnational proletariat. The outcome of this contest was never a given. Nevertheless, as I have 
already stated, it is indisputable that the Bolsheviks promoted their agenda with the help of 
coercive measures, both within and outside the Soviet Union. The history of the interventions in 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan alone is a clear testimony to this fact.    
         
A European international society? 
 
                                               
13 For a good example, see Susanne Birgerson (2002): After the Break-up of a Multi-Ethnic Empire. As she 
states in chapter 1, page 4, ‘The point of departure for this study is that political systems break up largely as 
the result of demands for sovereignty from minorities. The creation of smaller states that have as their basis 
a nationalist ideology is a familiar, typical outcome.’  
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The claim that it is possible to observe a European regional international society, at first, seems to 
be an odd one. Is not European international society to be equated with what I have called 
Westphalian international society? As far as one by European international society mean the 
society based on the international institution of sovereign and equal statehood, then yes. Yet, this 
is not what I am getting at here. What I am getting at is the European regional international society 
which developed after the end of World War II and which is now referred to as the EU. What I 
intend to show is that the institutional arrangements entailed in this political project have heralded a 
new principle of legitimacy, that of divisible sovereignty. Or actually, it is not that new. As Fabbrini 
(2007) has demonstrated, it bears a striking resemblance to the principle of divisible sovereignty in 
the American states-union. Following this, I will again discuss how this principle of legitimacy 
relates to other international institutions.         
 The EU has always been considered a strange object of analysis in the disciplines of IR 
and comparative politics. The premise of most disciplinary debates on the topic is that it is 
something unique, something in between a state and an intergovernmental organization, whereas 
the substance is whether it is more of the former or the latter (Wallace 1999, 518-9; Diez and 
Whitman 2002, 43-5; Hill and Smith 2005, 4-5). This may also be why European studies has 
managed to establish itself as a separate branch of knowledge, often with its own institutes, 
centres and departments. The dominant explanatory narrative sustaining this division tells us that 
the member-states are ‘pooling’ their sovereignty with the effect of creating a completely novel 
political organizational form. Yet, despite this claim of novelty, the debate on the EU still seems to 
be trapped inside the statist paradigm’s first assumption, which holds that authority must be 
hierarchical and exclusive. In other words, if the member-states are not fully sovereign and 
independent, this must necessarily imply that they are pooling some of their sovereignty to create a 
higher, supranational authority. Deudney’s (1995, 193) explanation for why IR theorists have failed 
to comprehend the true quality of the American states-union appears to be equally relevant to the 
EU: ‘Ever since Jean Bodin and Samuel Pufendorf struggled to make sense of Switzerland and the 
German Empire, realist theorists have insisted that entities are either federal states or interstate 
confederations, but never anything in between’. To sum up, the ontological status of the EU is 
established with the help of either an exceptionalist argument or with reference to the statist 
paradigm’s first assumption. 
 Yet, as I have already alluded to, a less strained argument would hold that the EU has 
come to embody the principle of divisible sovereignty, not unlike that found in the early American 
states-union. Some powers (or ‘competencies’ in EU jargon), notably those relating to trade policy, 
have been exclusively delegated to the union centre, whereas other powers, for example the 
monopoly on violence, remain the prerogative of the member-states (although strong political 
forces are trying to transfer these to the union centre via the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP)) . This is not to claim that this principle of divisible sovereignty has been accepted 
(internalized) as a matter of belief by the broader European public, but it has certainly been 
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institutionalized in the form of an intricate set of durable and recognised patterns of shared 
practices over the past 50 years or so.     
 This has had a profound impact on a number of other international institutions. War, for 
example, is now deemed virtually unthinkable within the EU. It has become a security community, 
to use Deutsch et al.’s (1957) old concept.14 Whether it was the security community that made 
divisible sovereignty possible or whether it was the other way around, is besides the point. Few 
scholars would dispute that the two emerged together and in various ways co-constituted each 
other. It should also be noted that the institution of war has only been abandoned inside the EU. It 
is very much alive in the union’s external relations, as well as those of individual member-states. 
The same goes for the balance of power. It, too, has been abandoned inside the EU, while still 
featuring in its external relations.  
 Diplomacy is also being transformed within the EU, with certain functions converging at the 
union level and some being retained at the state level. The recently adopted Lisbon Treaty 
includes provisions for an EU foreign minister and a corresponding union-level diplomatic corps in 
the form of the External Action Service (EEAS). Some of these institutional arrangements seem to 
have been pioneered  by political entrepreneurs keen on making the EU into a federal state, but 
this should not detract from the point that they can also be viewed as a way of rethinking diplomacy 
within the context of divisible sovereignty (Keukeleire 2003; Hocking and Spence 2005; Bátora 
2005). Similarly, the ‘internal market’ can be thought of as a federalist project, but equally as a 
regional institution of trade that is markedly different from trade regimes in other regions and the 
global trade regime governed by the World Trade Organization.       
It is true that the nation-state remains the central focus of Europeans’ identity. 
Eurobarometer polls consistently show that Europeans identify more with their countries or local 
regions than they do with Europe, and to the extent that they do identify with Europe, it is a 
comparatively ‘thin’ existential community (Schmidt 2004, 981; Smith 1992). This is also reflected 
in the fact that individual member states have often approached European integration from the 
perspective of furthering specific national interests: in the case of France, to regain a leading role 
in Europe, and in the case of Denmark, to secure continued access to export markets. As Laffan 
(1996, 87) puts it, ‘the “European project” has been embraced by many states as a means of 
strengthening their existing state identities and as an arena within which to project their state 
identities’. This is probably also why EU officials since the 1980s have increasingly deployed 
traditional nation-building strategies such as promoting an EU flag and an EU passport, together 
with a European anthem and host of pan-European cultural and sporting events (Laffan 1996, 97). 
Rarely is the EU discussed as an alternative to the nation-state, and when it is, this is often done 
critically. As Schmidt (2004, 990) argues: 
 
                                               
14 See also Ole Waever (1998). 
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while EU-related changes in policy are generally the subject of much national 
discourse, with national leaders often using the EU as blame-shifting device 
to ensure public acceptance, EU-related changes in the ‘polity’, that is, in the 
traditional workings of national democracy, have mainly been a matter of 
institutional creep, and are mostly passed over in silence – except, of course, 
during referendums and parliamentary debates about treaty ratification and in 
the UK under Margaret Thatcher and John Major.  
 
Divisible sovereignty, with all its practical manifestations, does not appear to be on par with 
nationalism as a principle of legitimacy in the European imagination. However, it is still there and 
does guide political practices in numerous areas, some of which I have outlined above.  
 The familiar story of how the EU emerged holds that a number of European states, and in 
particular France and Germany, agreed to create a supranational authority regulating the 
production of coal and steel for the explicit purpose of mutually shackling the main means of war. 
The declared aim was to make war ‘not only unthinkable but also materially impossible’ (Schuman 
1950). The European project has since come a long way since then, and its international 
institutions have evolved quite far beyond this initial purpose. At the moment, it does not seem to 
be a new state or empire in the making, but rather a multifaceted regional international society, 
influencing and being influenced by the Westphalian international society from which it originally 
emerged. 
 
Conclusion: blind spots revisited  
 
This article has fundamentally been an exercise in freeing up our minds. Its premise was that the 
two assumptions of the statist paradigm were wrong, plain and simple, as universal statements 
about political organisation. There was no intention of proving of them wrong. Instead, the idea has 
been to show how an alternative story can be told about the cases above if we adopt an English 
School approach, one that sees them as examples of regionally-led change in international society. 
Here the focus is on the institutions of international society and specifically new principles of 
legitimacy which seem to imply communities of loyalty and organisation of authority transcending 
the boundaries of formally established states. Rather than seeing the EU and the American states-
union as new states in the making, a case has been made for conceptualising them as examples 
of divisible sovereignty or plural authorities. And the French revolution, international fascism and 
international communism have been presented as examples of transnational loyalty rooted in new 
principles of legitimacy.  
 While the reader may be convinced of the correctness of these assessments, s/he may 
however still object that some of these phenomena, in particular the French revolution and 
international fascism, were relatively short-lived. In this sense, they could still be viewed as 
 19 
exceptions. My answer to this is that it is true that their concrete manifestation in particular states 
such as revolutionary France and nazi Germany was indeed very brief. Yet, as Armstrong (1993) 
has convincingly demonstrated, they left a lasting mark on international society and its institutions. 
In his words, ‘Major revolutions appear to force established states to rediscover and redefine both 
their social identities as members of a society of states and the normative and juridical principles 
upon which that society is based’ (Armstrong 1993, 243). Thus, following the French revolution, it 
became increasingly hard to govern a state without some semblance of deference to the 
amorphous entity called the ‘popular will’. And in the course of the defeat of nazi Germany, the 
institution of colonialism was decisively de-legitimated by that state’s decision to apply it within 
Europe as opposed to reserving it for the ‘savages’ outside. It therefore seems to me that 
Armstrong is right when he talks about a process of socialisation and counter-socialisation 
whereby the revolutionary state experiences pressures to conform to the prevailing norms of 
international society while at the same time challenging and changing these very norms. 
 In my view, however, the idea of regionally-led change in international society should not be 
restricted to what we usually consider revolutionary-type developments. Change is obviously most 
evident in these events – this is what the very concept of revolution implies – but that does not 
necessarily mean that subtle change does not occur in-between them. For example, elsewhere I 
have analysed the emergence of the welfare state as a distinct principle of legitimacy in 
international society and how it has impacted those states’ adhering to it positions vis-à-vis trade, 
war and diplomacy (Author 2010). Usually this is not considered a revolutionary development, but it 
has certainly changed the way international relations are conducted in some parts of international 
society, most notably Scandinavia. Looking at regionally-led change thus implies a very expansive 
research agenda, one that we are only now starting to see the contours of (see also Buzan 2004; 
Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009) . This involves first of all accepting the idea that international 
society is not a monolithic whole, and that different regions can form distinct social complexes. 
However, institutional differentiation does not have to be restricted to one geographical region; it 
can certainly also be present in several non-contiguous territories, as I described in relation to 
international fascism. In our present globalized world, where distance has shrunk and the 
exchange of goods as well as ideas have hugely increased, we are probably going to see much 
more complex constellations of institutional practices, where some are restricted to certain 
geographical regions and yet others will be shared in a number of different localities across the 
globe. The story in this article has mainly been about the past, but I hope it will equally serve as a 
compelling template for exploring international relations of the present as well as the future.            
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